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Abstract 
Ageing populations are a major challenge for most developed countries, where social security 
systems were developed in the post war period. It has been suggested that the costs of caring for 
the ageing population places a considerable strain on individuals, as well as on the public purse, and 
many countries are looking for ways to reduce costs. One of the major issues is the relationship 
between health care and social care. This paper considers health care and social care as 
complements and substitutes through a household production framework. We demonstrate how 
health care and social care are attributes that are valued by individuals and how in the presence of a 
perfect market individuals would choose combinations of these attributes.  We highlight how, even 
with technical efficiency, sub-optimal combinations of health and social care may be chosen. We 
also show, through the introduction of a new good, how there may be opportunities to alleviate the 
costs of the ageing population. 
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Introduction 
The ageing population is a major global challenge, with developed countries struggling as the 
proportion of elderly in their populations increase. Many countries have social security systems that 
were developed after the war and were put in place to aid needy populations and are not well 
equipped to deal with an ageing population. One question that countries need to answer is 'what do 
we want for our ageing population?' There are equity and efficiency objectives that underpin views 
towards the elderly, however, in general there is a desire for individuals to have long, healthy, active 
and independent lives. Underlying these goals are issues of costs, where individuals and the state, 
operating within their budget constraints (and with fixed budgets), wish to allocate resources to the 
ageing process or, more specifically, altering and adapting to the way that health and functioning 
vary with age. In the background to all of these issues often lies the (health) objective of equal 
access for equal need, although, as Hauck et al. (2002) demonstrate resource allocation that tries to 
accommodate alternative aims can lead to the mis-allocation of resources. These debates are 
further complicated by the increasing use, and cost of, technologies that are also increasing health 
care expenditures (Breyer et al., 2010). 1 2  
 State resources, be it pensions, or contributions to long-term care, or some other form of state 
support, are being placed under pressure and the proportion of individuals over 65 increases. 
Individual budgets are under pressure because individuals live longer and work, proportionately, for 
a shorter period of their lives.  Further, there can be incentives for individuals and institutions to 
behave in a way that is not optimal for society, trying to shift costs onto other individuals or 
institutions, leading to free-riding and inefficiency, and so increasing the costs of care and ageing. 
The costs of caring for the ageing population are expected to rise considerably in the coming years. 
The U.S. Administration on Aging predicts people in the 65+ age cohort will grow from about 13% of 
the population in 2010 to about 20% of the population by 2030. This will affect the social security 
fund that, at current rates, is predicted to move from surplus to deficit in 2023 and be exhausted by 
2036 (OASDI Trustees Report, 2011). Medicare provides community care through its home health 
care scheme and in the 2011 trustees report it was predicted that the fund would begin to run out of 
money in 2024. Further, Hall and Jones (2007) suggest that the optimal share of health spending 
should rise from 15.4% of GDP in 2000, to over 30% by the middle of the century. In the UK, the 
Dilnot Commission suggested that under the current funding system the cost of the ageing 
population to the tax payer would rise from £14.6 billion in 2010/11 to £23 billion by 2025/26. It is 
vital for decision-makers to find ways of funding care which are equitable and efficient. However, 
many of the figures relating to costs need to be treated carefully because changes in epidemiology 
are often not accounted for when predicting costs. 
 
The optimal way of funding and dealing with the problem of the ageing population is facing 
considerable scrutiny. Wittenberg et al. (2002) outline a range of issues and options for funding the 
care of the elderly. Fernandez and Forder (2012) compare the experiences of the UK, France, 
Germany and Japan in reforming their longer term care financing arrangements with those of the 
US. The former group have sought to develop partnerships between individuals and their states to 
‘share, efficiently and equitably, the responsibilities associated with paying for the care of 
                                                          
1 There is a body of work that suggests that health care expenditures are not related to age once other factors 
have been controlled for (Zweifel et al., 1999, Shang and Goldman 2008). This is known as the "red herring" 
hypothesis. The results of Breyer et al. (2010) do confirm the existence of a weak red-herring hypothesis and 
find that population ageing accounts for a 0.5% growth rate in health expenditures. Also, see Payne et al. 
(2007) for a review. 
2
 Most studies consider elements of health care, social care, pension costs etc. Generally when referring to 
increasing costs we are considering all of these elements. OECD projections of public health and long-term 
care expenditures range from 3.5% - 6% for the period 2005-2050 (Martins et al., 2006) 
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dependent people’. The debate in the US is centred more on market provision of long term care 
where the ‘implication is that for the foreseeable future there is little chance that a social insurance 
approach would be politically viable in the United States’ (Frank, 2012). In both circumstances, why 
the market may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in social care is a key issue for policy 
makers. 
The rate at which healthy life expectancy (the years spent in good health) matches total life 
expectancy is a key issue in determining the costs of the ageing population. Healthy life-expectancy 
is important because the longer people remain healthy, the longer they are independent, stay out of 
hospital and stay out of long term care. There are three (simplified) ways that life-expectancy and 
health life-expectancy could interact. Firstly, as life-expectancy increases, healthy life-expectancy 
shows larger absolute increases. Secondly, life expectancy and health life-expectancy move together 
by the same amount. Thirdly, life expectancy increases more (in absolute terms) than healthy life-
expectancy.  In all three scenarios individuals live longer, but in scenario one it is possible to delay 
retirement for longer because of increasing health life-expectancy, providing opportunities to save 
more to fund retirement. The second scenario may be neutral in the sense that the period in which 
individuals are unable to work is unchanged. However, if individuals become unhealthy at a later age 
then ageing may be more severe and there may be increasing costs. Finally, there are increased 
costs because although individuals live longer, the time which they are not working is increasing at a 
faster rate than the opportunities to work and save. In the US Spillman (2000) estimated that health 
care costs increased at an accelerating rate as the number of years spent in a reduced health state 
increased as a proportion of total life expectancy. This was in contrast to their findings about acute 
medical costs which increased at a decreasing rate.  In the UK the Office for Nation Statistics (ONS) 
suggests that the situation will be the same for Great Britain. The ONS figures suggest, with some 
uncertainty, that the gap between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy will be 11.5 years in 
2025, compared to 9.75 years in 2005 (Mayhew et al., 2010).  These figures suggest that the costs 
will increase all other things being equal. 
This paper uses household production frameworks (Lancaster, 1966 and Grossman, 1972) to 
investigate the relationship between health care and social care as complements and substitutes. In 
the Lancaster framework we consider the role of attributes. In the Grossman framework we use the 
standard goods framework. We show that both frameworks can be used to demonstrate important 
concerns for the care of the elderly. We show how, even in the presence of technical efficiency, it is 
possible for individuals to consume sub-optimal combinations of health and social care.  We also 
consider the introduction of a new product that is designed to assist ageing. Assisted living 
technologies (ALTs) are increasingly being seen as a mechanism for addressing the problems of 
ageing. We show that their uptake will depend on the relationship between health care and social 
care, and the valuation of the attributes that ALTs provide. 
 
Health and Social Care: Substitutes and complements 
The model of Lancaster (1966) provides an ideal framework for considering the relationship between 
health care and social care. In this framework goods contain a bundle of attributes and for simplicity 
we consider two goods, a health good and a care good, and two attributes, health care and social 
care. Both goods provide both attributes but in different quantities. Health goods, for example a 
hospital stay, provide the attributes of health care - individuals can be monitored and treated during 
their stay and this provides them with health care. Health goods also provide the attribute social 
care - a hospital stay includes social care aspects such as meals and easy access to facilities. Likewise 
care goods provide both the attributes of social care, the care component, and health care, including 
monitoring or recovery. It would be expected that health goods provide more of the health care 
attribute, while care goods provide more of the social care attribute. 
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IC 
In this model consumer preferences are defined in terms of the attributes and the demand for the 
goods is a derived demand, ie goods are inputs into a production process, where the production 
process involves extracting attributes from the goods. Individuals purchase the health good and the 
care good in order to obtain the health care and social care attributes, which in turn, according to 
Grossman (1972), are also derived demands. 
In our simple model with two goods, x1 (health good) and x2 (care good), and two attributes, a1 
(health care) and a2 (social care) we suggest that each good xj yields a vector of attributes αj = (α1j, 
a2j) where each αij ≥ 0. We assume that the amount of attribute i yielded by one unit of good j is fixed 
regardless of the level of consumption.  
The amount of attribute i that can be obtained from the two goods is: 
                             
Utility is represented on the basis of attributes (rather than goods). This gives the following 
optimization problem: 
                                           
 
 
                      
                 
Figure 1: model in attribute space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The attributes are measured on the axes. Purchasing a unit of Hg (health goods) will produce α11 of 
attribute 1 (health care) and α21 of attribute 2 (social care). The ray OHg1 shows the combinations of 
health care and social care produced when the individual buys only Hg. Ray OCg2 shows similar 
combination for Cg. If all income is spent on Hg then the individual will be at A1 on OHg1. If all 
income is spent on Cg the individual will be at A2 on OCg1. Individuals may choose to consume 
combinations of goods, and so all the points in the area OA1A2 are feasible, with the line A1A2 the 
efficiency frontier. Individuals would choose combinations along A1A2 in order to maximise utility, 
points inside the frontier are not efficient - consumers can be made better off by choosing a 
different combination of goods. If an individual bought OA3 units of Hg and OA4 units of Cg then 
they would be at point A5 on the efficient frontier. If the individual has preferences shown by the 
indifference curve IC then point A5 will be their optimal combination of health goods and care 
goods. 
O 
A5 
A2 
A4 
A3 
A1 
Hg1 
Cg1 
Cg 
Hg 
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Using this analysis we can think of the implicit prices of the attributes, rather than the prices of the 
goods. Solving the model yields: 
   
           
             
     
           
             
    
rearranging gives: 
   
           
             
     
           
             
    
simplifying notation gives: 
            
Where π1 and π2 can be considered as the implicit prices of the attributes, where their ratio is equal 
to the slope of the budget line. We can also consider the valuation equations: 
              
              
 
The left-hand side gives the value of the bundle of characteristics contained in one unit of each 
good. This highlights the relationship between attributes and price. The price of a good is equal to 
the value placed on the characteristics. In our example we can think of the price of care being 
equated to the value placed on the social care attribute and the health care attribute that makes up 
a unit of care. 
From this type of analysis it is possible to consider the association between attributes and goods and 
individual behaviour. In systems where the health good is provided centrally through national 
insurance or general taxation schemes and is free at the point of delivery (or involves only small co-
payments), then its price is low relative to the care good (many more aspects of care goods are paid 
for by the individuals compared to health care). In this case individuals can consume many units of 
health care and obtain high levels of the attributes health care and social care (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Relatively inexpensive health good and corner solutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case the budget constraint is almost vertical and if the individual has preferences shown by 
the indifference curve IC1, they will choose the corner solution a. With this choice the individual can 
obtain almost as much of the attribute social care by consuming the health care good, rather than 
consuming the care good. Only if the individual has preferences that are strongly in favour of the 
a 
O 
A5 
 
 
 
 
Hg1 
Cg1 
Cg 
Hg 
IC1 
IC2 
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social care attribute (as illustrated by the steeper indifference curve IC2) would the individual 
purchase both the health good and the care good.  
Such a scenario could be considered from a decision maker's view-point. If the health good and the 
care good budgets are separate then it may be in the interest of the (health) care provider to 
encourage individuals to consume more of the health good (care good) rather than provide care 
goods.  In this case the individual gains social care attributes through the consumption of the health 
good Hg but the social care provider incurs no cost.  
Figure 3: Social decision maker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapting our figure (Figure 3) it is possible to demonstrate the issues surrounding health and care 
goods as complements. The unbroken line gives the constraint faced by the social decision maker. 
The dashed constraint is the constraint that the individual would face if health and social care were 
provided in a private market.3 The indifference curve IC1 is that of the individual's and in a private 
market they would choose the point b. The social decision maker chooses point a, which only 
purchases the health good on behalf of the individual. In this case the individual needs/wants more 
social care, with b on a higher indifference curve. Here health care is acting as a substitute for social 
care. The individual would choose a combination of health and social care where they are acting as 
complements, increasing overall utility to the individual. Point a is on the efficient frontier; however 
it is not an optimal point given individual preferences. 
Ageing and health and social care production 
Maintaining the production function approach it is possible to reframe this problem based on the 
production models of Becker (1965) and Grossman (1972). In this approach we move away from the 
'attributes' space and back towards the more traditional 'goods' space. 
In this model the individual gains utility from the health good and the care good. We assume that 
there are diminishing returns to both the health good (Hg) and care good (Cg). As an illustration we 
assume that the utility function is: 
                (1) 
                                                          
3 In this case we have shown the private market providing more opportunities for individuals than those 
provided by a public sector provider. It is possible that the market provision would be below that of the public 
sector - or prices such that the individual's budget constraint is closer to the origin and the individual is on an 
indifference curve below IC1. 
b 
b 
IC1' 
a 
O 
 
 
 
 
 
Hg1 
Cg1 
Cg 
Hg 
IC1 
 
7 
 
b 
a 
IC 
IV 
II 
III 
I 
Hp 
Cp 
QHg 
QCg 
UHg 
UCg
H 
45o 
where 0 < α, β < 1. The individual faces the usual budget constraint, with an income, M, and prices 
ph and pc for the health and care good respectively. Solving the model yields the following solution: 
    
  
  
 
  
  
     (2) 
This result can be demonstrated in Figure 4 below. The south-western quadrant of the figure 
(quadrant III) describes all the alternative combinations of health (Hg) and care (Cg) that could be 
purchased for a given budget (M).  The north-western (II) and south-eastern (IV) quadrants contain 
the health production and care production functions and they both exhibit diminishing marginal 
returns, as suggested by equation (1).  The north-eastern quadrant (I) shows the all possible 
combinations of utility that a consumer could obtain from the possible combinations of health and 
care (Ush).  The consumer's indifference curve (IC) describes the combinations of utility from health 
care and social care that the consumers is indifferent between.  The indifference curve is convex, 
demonstrating a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between the health good and the care 
good - increasing amounts of one good are required to compensate for decreases in the other good. 
If goods were perfect substitutes the indifference curve would be a straight line. If the goods were 
perfect complements the indifference curves would be L shaped. For a given amount of the health 
(care) good utility would not increase as the quantity of the care (health) good was increased. The 
optimal combination is where the indifference curve is tangential to the utility frontier. In this case 
this is when the consumer splits their expenditure equally between the health and the care good.  
 
Figure 4: Health production model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This approach highlights some of the issues surrounding health care and social care and their role as 
substitutes and complements. If health care is used as a substitute for social care, even with 
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technical efficiency, i.e. the consumer chooses a combination that means that they are on their 
utility frontier in quadrant I, say at point b, then the individual is worse-off than at point a. The 
individual would be better off reducing the amount of the health good consumed and increasing the 
amount of the care good and moving to point a, at this point there is allocative and technical 
efficiency. 
We can extend this analysis to consider a number of scenarios. From our optimisation the impact of 
reducing the price of the health good (ph) is λ*Hg*, where λ* is the optimal value of the Lagrange 
multiplier and Hg* is the optimal level of the health good purchased. This is positive and indicates 
that a reduction in the price of the health good increases the amount of the health good purchased, 
although there will be a substitution and an income effect that may lead to changes in the 
consumption of the care good as well.  
Firstly, we consider the scenario where the health good is less expensive than the care good (Figure 
5). This is an important scenario because for many individuals health care is less expensive than 
social care. In many countries there is more intervention in the health care market than in the social 
care market, meaning that the payments that individuals incur for health care, at the point of 
delivery, are generally lower. This may be due to the government provision of health care, or it may 
come from individuals having insurance. 
Figure 5: Less expensive health goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5, a new budget line in quadrant III means that a new set of consumption opportunities are 
available.  These are represented by the new utility frontier in quadrant I.  From the figure it can be 
seen that the optimal point (a) involves the consumption of more of the health good and less of the 
care good. 
a 
IV 
II 
III 
Hp 
Cp 
QHg 
QCg 
UHg 
UCg 
45o 
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In this framework, the parameters α and β describe the way that the health good and the care good 
are transformed into utility. Changes in these parameters affect the utility and the optimal choices 
of the individual, with an increase in one of these parameters increasing the amount of utility the 
individual can obtain for a given input. Further, an increase in the parameter α (β) will increase the 
amount of the health (care) good consumed.  
Figure 6: Ageing individuals and changes in the production functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One possible way that ageing may affect individuals is that they gain less from a given amount of 
health care, i.e. their health production function falls, in this case moves down in quadrant II 
towards the Qh axis (Hp to Hp’). However, individuals may benefit more from a given amount of 
social care. Social care to an independent individual in their 40s is unlikely to provide much benefit, 
but would be beneficial to an older individual. If these changes are proportional we can re-write the 
utility function in the following form: 
 
              (3) 
In this scenario as the parameter β increases the ability to transform care goods to utility increases, 
but the ability to transform health goods decreases. This is a way to consider the ageing process. As 
individuals age, their ability to transform care goods to utility increases and their ability to transform 
health goods decreases. This is shown in Figure 6 which demonstrates how the utility frontier 
changes shape. The comparative statics for the model demonstrate that as β increases the 
production functions rotate in quadrant II (down) and quadrant IV (up). These movements result in a 
change in the utility frontier in quadrant I. In this example the individual moves to a lower 
indifference curve (IC') and chooses a combination containing more of the care good and less of the 
health good.  
IC 
IV 
II 
III 
I 
Hp 
Cp 
QHg 
QCg 
UHg 
UCg 
45o 
Hp' 
Cp' 
IC' 
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In this case we assume that the social care production function moves upwards - towards the Uh axis 
in quadrant IV. The impact of such an ageing process would suggest that individuals would substitute 
away from health care towards social care. This would move the individual's utility frontier in 
quadrant I, although whether overall utility would increase or decrease would depend on the 
magnitude of the changes to the health and social care production functions. However, if, as 
individuals age, there is an increase in the use of health care, rather than social care, then the 
individual will move onto a lower indifference curve (even if technical efficiency is maintained). The 
marginal rates of substitution are not equal and so the individual would be worse-off. This is 
potentially the scenario that is witnessed among older individuals.  
 
Introduction of a new good: Assisted living technologies (ALTs) 
The models considered thus far can be extended to consider the role of new technologies that are 
aimed at improving care. There is a considerable focus on the role of the private sector to provide 
ALTs that are beneficial for ageing individuals and that may also ease the cost burden on the public 
purse. There are potential externalities that may be derived from the introduction of ALTs, in which 
case we would expect the market to under provide them. 
Firstly, we can consider how the ALTs may be beneficial to the ageing process. ALTs could be 
considered simply as another care good. Individuals purchase these goods, along with other care 
goods and the purchase of these goods increases utility at a decreasing rate. If the existence of ALTs 
reduces the cost of care goods then the budget line will pivot in quadrant III (Figure 7). 
However, we suggest that the use of technology provides potential efficiency gains, meaning that for 
a given amount of the care good individuals gain greater utility. In our model this would mean an 
increase in the parameter β in equation (1), in the four quadrant diagram this means rotating the 
function in quadrant IV upwards, so that there is greater utility derived for a given amount of the 
care good, ie an increase in technology. 4 
The result (in Figure 7) would be that individuals would purchase more of the care good and less of 
the health good (although the exact nature of the change would depend on the income and 
substitution effects stemming from a price change). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In this case we assume that we are starting from equation (1) and there is no adverse impact on the health 
production function in quadrant II. 
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Figure 7: The effect of ALTs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the market for ALTs seems to be under-developed, why may this be the case? Returning to 
the Lancaster (1966) (Figure 8) framework it is possible to consider the introduction of a new good. 
In this case ALTs. In the model goods are bundles of attributes, in this case the attributes are health 
care and social care. Firstly, we assume that ALTs provide more of the social care attribute than 
either of the other goods. In this case we introduce a new ray on our figure (OALT). 
 Figure 8: Introduction of ALTs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the individual purchases Hg and Cg the efficient frontier is A1A2, if they purchase Cg and ALT is it 
A2A3. If the consumer purchases Hg and ALT then it is A1A3. So at current prices, if the consumer 
spends all their income on ALTs they can purchase A3. We can also see that the individual will never 
purchase all three goods. Furthermore, the individual will not purchase combinations of Hg and ALT 
A2 ALT 
IC 
IV 
II 
III 
I 
Hp 
Sp 
QH 
QS 
UH 
UH 
45o 
a b 
O 
A1 
A3 
Hg1 
Cg1 
Cg 
Hg 
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because this frontier (A1A3) lies within the A1A2A3 frontier. The consumer will purchase either Hg 
and Cg, or Cg and ALT.  
At the current prices and the current preferences, as given by the indifference curve, the consumer 
will purchase combinations of Hg and Cg and none of the ALT good. In this case the price is too high. 
At lower prices A3 would move out to the right and it may be possible to find multiple equilibria 
where there are feasible bundles of Hg and Cg and Cg and ALT between which the consumer is 
indifferent. 
Alternatively one could recast the Lancaster formulation to consider the introduction of ALTs 
compared to other care goods. In this case the attributes would be the different social care 
attributes provided by care goods, such as independence, peace of mind, dignity, social interaction 
etc... Each of these attributes will have an implicit price πj. The key for firms is to find the value of 
the implicit prices for the attributes, perhaps from market data or from discrete choice experiments, 
which will provide the maximum price the ALTs could be sold at. The problem may be that the 
valuation of the attributes is weighted in favour of other social care goods. For example, one issue 
surrounding ALTs may be the fact that they reduce the need for social interaction by reducing visits 
to the doctor, or by reducing the need for home helpers. This may mean that consumers are always 
more willing to purchase goods providing the social interaction attribute, regardless of how low the 
price of the ALT. 
 
 
Discussion 
This paper has considered a framework where there are two goods, a health good and a care good. 
In order to understand the problems associated with ageing we have considered how individuals 
may combine these two goods in order maximise their benefit. We have shown how it is possible, 
even when faced with technical efficiency, to have a suboptimal combination of health and care. 
Combinations may be on the utility frontier but the marginal rates of substitution are not equal, so 
by reallocating their budget, so consuming less of one good and more of another, it is possible to 
achieve a better outcome, demonstrating the need to consider health and care as complements and 
not substitutes. However, it may be the case for social decision makers with fixed budgets, especially 
where the care budget is much less than the health budget, that they are treated as substitutes.  
We have also demonstrated, using this framework, how the ageing process may impact on the way 
that health and care are viewed as substitutes or complements. Care is more important as 
individual's age. Health goods become less productive through ageing; individuals need more in 
order to maintain a given standard of health. This approach would be in line with health production 
models, such as those suggested by Grossman (1972) where individuals require an increasing 
investment in the health stock in order to maintain the level above the death stock. Such an 
approach highlights the increasing importance of care and how individuals would shift towards 
increased care, and less health, as they aged. Consumers are willing to give up health goods in order 
to obtain more care goods that have a higher marginal benefit.  
The problem for consumers is that often, as they age, they are required, or the incentives are such, 
that they consume more health goods. In fact there may be an over consumption of health goods, 
especially if there are negative externalities that arise from the increased burden on the public 
purse. Again, health goods are acting as substitutes for care goods, rather than complements.  
The use of a production framework also allows the consideration of the attributes of the health and 
care goods. In this paper this has been simplified to two attributes, health care and social care. 
13 
 
Approaching health and care in this manner allows the recognition that they are derived demands 
and that health and care both provide the attributes, just in different proportions. Substituting 
health for care is possible because health goods provide the attribute social care, although not to the 
same extent as care goods. Likewise, it would be possible to substitute care for health because care 
goods also provide the attribute health care but not to the same extent as health goods.  
Using the attributes framework it is possible to demonstrate how corner solutions may occur, 
especially those where individuals only consume the health good. If the health good did not provide 
the social care attribute such corner solutions would not be possible. Pricing care goods is vital; if 
they are too expensive then consumers will purchase more health goods, perhaps to the complete 
exclusion of care goods. 
The analysis has been developed further in order to consider the role of ALTs. These may be a 
method for relieving some of the burden of an ageing population. ALTs could be viewed as 
improving the technology and increasing the marginal benefit of care goods.  
Market failures 
One issue that has not been considered here, but has been widely discussed elsewhere is that of 
market failure (for an example for long-term care see Wittenberg et al (2002)). In a perfect market 
age provision would be tackled through insurance, for both health care and social care. An individual 
who is going to live longer would consume less now, save more and smooth consumption through 
time. This process occurs because individuals value consumption in the future more than they value 
consumption now.  However, ageing is an uncertain process and in the presence of uncertainty risk-
averse individuals will purchase insurance in order to maximise utility. Actuarially fair insurance will 
provide the risk-averse agent with security in the future and protect against adverse outcomes. 
Insurance may be bought for health care, for long-term care, and, in the case of pensions, by the 
purchasing of annuities. The difficulty is that, due to market failure, there are problems in all of 
these insurance approaches.  
At the heart of the problem are information asymmetries. There is a potential problem of adverse 
selection where individuals may have knowledge about their potential need for long-term care 
which the insurer is not aware of. This creates a problem at the heart of pooling risks for insurers. If 
insurers set their premiums at a level for a fair premium based on the average risk of needing care, 
then individuals who have knowledge that they are above average risk will purchase the insurance, 
while individuals who are below average risk will not purchase insurance. This leads to the average 
risk of the insured increasing, pushing up premiums. This same process continues until only those at 
highest risk are insured, and the costs of meeting the needs of these individuals are too great for the 
insurance companies to cover. The problem of moral hazard is less likely to be an issue, although it 
depends on the structure of the insurance policy.  
 
A further issue for adult social care is an inter-temporal issue where the events being insured against 
occur a considerable time after the insurance policy is taken out. Even if insurance is offered at the 
age of 65 it is possible that social care will not be needed for 15-20 years or more, this means that it 
is difficult for insurance companies to assess potential costs. In fact if life-expectancy is increasing as 
well over this time then the projections could be very wide of the mark. If insurance is offered at 40 
then this time period could be 50 years hence, making it even more difficult. 
 
A further problem with insurance is that it may not provide any encouragement for cost-
containment. Having a third party payer means that there is no incentive to adopt efficient practices, 
it is possible to shift the cost to the private sector. Like health care there are considerable issues in 
information gaps. There is heterogeneity and market power among providers of social care making it 
difficult for individuals to make choices. It is difficult for individuals to ascertain and differentiate 
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between the benefits the services the various providers offer and large segments of the market are 
dominated by non-commercial organisations exerting near monopolistic powers in terms of price or 
quality of service provided. There are problems regarding information around the demand for 
unfamiliar goods. In classical economics it is considered that individuals are the best judge of their 
own welfare but in terms of social care it is often the decisions of others which matter. Informal 
carers are an important part of social care. It is often the availability of family and friends, and their 
willingness to contribute which affects the use of more expensive residential care. This creates 
problems for the incentives behind any funding system, especially where the person needing care 
has assets. The problems of overlapping generations, and the problem of increasing house prices has 
increased the importance of bequests. Furthermore, the classical model takes no account of 
cognitive decline in assuming that an individual is their own best judge. 
 
Another issue that has not been raised is the problem of informal carers. It may be that care goods 
are largely consumed outside of the market with, in essence, charitable giving crowding out market 
goods. Care, and the attribute social care, can be provided by informal carers. So consumers may not 
substitute away from care to health goods but they may substitute care goods for informal care. 
Informal care provides the attribute social care, and it may do so at a lower cost than the market is 
able to provide this attribute. Further, informal care may provide positive externalities and reduce 
the cost of care for the ageing population.   It has been estimated in evidence to the Dilnot 
commission, Casey (2011), using human capital valuation, that informal care is equivalent to 1.4% of 
annual GDP and that 0.8% of GDP is forgone by informal carers non participation in the labour 
market, based on estimates by Leontaridi and Bell (2001) and Henz (2004). In fact at the interaction 
between consumers and informal carers there may be opportunities for technologies such as ALTs. If 
ALTs can help informal carers they may be an important method of helping both the ageing 
individual and their informal carers. 
A further level of complexity and market failure in this area is added by the possible presence of 
supplier induced demand. A key assumption of perfect markets is the independence of the utility 
functions of suppliers and demanders. However, in the area of health care it has always been 
suggested that supplier induced demand is a considerable problem (Labelle et al., 1994). The 
problem may be that the costs of the ageing population are confounded by the presence of supplier 
induced demand, and that the (potential) over consumption of health care by individuals is physician 
led and not patient driven. Birch et al. (2013) use data for England and suggest that the ageing 
population is not the driver behind increasing health care use, but supply. Any models of costs need 
to account for these potential confounders. Our framework has been and results have been 
developed assuming that supplier induced demand is not a problem. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided a framework for considering health care and social care as complements 
and substitutes. We have approached this through two production mechanisms. The first approach 
follows the model of Lancaster and considers health care and social care as attributes provided by 
goods. This approach is insightful because it highlights why and how health and social care become 
substitutes, and further, demonstrates how individuals may end up consuming sub-optimal 
combinations of health and social care. In the presence of subsidised health care individuals will 
over-consume health care and under consume social care. This is partly made possible because 
health goods provide the attributes that care goods provide. 
The second framework uses the individual health production model of Grossman. In the model 
health care and social care are considered only in the goods space (not attributes space). However, it 
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is possible to demonstrate how, even in the presence of technical efficiency, in the sense that the 
individual is on their highest utility frontier, it is possible to have inefficient allocations of health and 
social care. Further, within this framework it is possible to consider how the ageing process may 
impact on the individual's ability to transform health and social care goods into utility, and how the 
individual would increasingly prefer social care to health care.  
Within this framework we also introduce technology in the form of assisted living technologies 
(ALTs). There has been an increasing focus on the use of these technologies to aid the ageing 
process. We demonstrate, using the Grossman approach, how these technologies may benefit the 
ageing process by increasing the marginal product of social care. We also demonstrate, using the 
Lancaster framework, why ALTs may not be able to obtain a presence in the market - they are 
crowded out by the presence of health care and social care which has a large state provision. 
This analysis is conducted against the background of market failure in the health care and social 
care. Both areas face considerable problems because of the presence of asymmetric information. 
The key driver behind the cost of ageing is found in the interdependence between the utility 
functions of the supplier and demanders of care. We have highlighted the fact that evidence exists 
that suggests that the use of health care is increasing at a faster rate than need in the population 
(Birch et al, 2013). This factor is one of the major cost drivers for ageing care and is a further reason 
why health care is a substitute for health care. However, our contribution demonstrates how, even 
from the demand side, such problems may arise. 
This analysis suggests that there are considerable efficiency gains to be made by allowing individuals 
to have greater autonomy over their choice of care. Hall and Jones (2007) suggest that as individuals 
become wealthier it is beneficial for individuals to purchase additional years of life, people become 
saturated in non-health consumption and the marginal utility from extra years of life is higher than 
for other consumption possibilities. If individuals are to purchase more years of life it is important to 
have well functioning markets and clear information that allow individuals to choose the optimal 
bundle. 
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